Trump tariff war: What’s keeping Xi Jinping awake at night?

The world is watching Donald Trump. Trump said on Tuesday that he’s just getting started, touting what he described as the “most successful first 100 days of any administration in the history of our country.” At a rally in Michigan, the 78-year-old basked in cheers while highlighting a presidency that has disrupted global alliances and shaken up US politics.
He also defended his tough trade stance, justifying steep tariffs on Chinese goods by saying Beijing “deserved” them and would likely bear most of the cost.
“You don’t know whether or not China’s going to eat it. China probably will eat those tariffs,” Trump told ABC News on Tuesday. “China was making $1 trillion dollars a year. They were ripping us off like nobody has ever ripped us off. Almost every country in the world was ripping us off. They’re not doing that anymore.”
In Washington, this is treated as a test of economic muscle. In capitals across Europe and Asia, leaders are scrambling to shield their economies from the fallout. Analysts, exporters, and investors are parsing China’s every move in response to Trump’s escalating tariff regime.
But in Zhongnanhai, the heavily guarded compound in the heart of Beijing where China’s top leaders work and live, the anxiety runs deeper-and in a very different direction.
Driving the news
It is not Trump’s tariffs, as bruising as they may be, that are keeping Chinese President Xi Jinping awake at night, a report in the Economist said. Relations with the United States and the world are “not top of the list for the things that might keep him awake at night,” a former senior American intelligence official told the Economist.
What haunts China’s most powerful leader in decades is something far more personal and destabilizing: signs that he cannot fully trust his own army. Or his party. Or perhaps even his own judgment.
The People’s Liberation Army is undergoing its most serious internal purge in over half a century. Key generals have disappeared. Trusted officials have been removed. Even those once considered Xi’s loyal enforcers have not been spared. As Xi fights a high-profile trade war abroad, he’s engaged in a far more consequential war at home-against corruption, disloyalty, and what he sees as rot within the very core of Communist Party power, the Economist report said.
Trade war theater, real crisis elsewhere
State media in China is working overtime to show a strong, defiant front. News broadcasts showcase Xi Jinping touring Southeast Asia, championing “regional economic integration” and promoting “multilateralism” in contrast to American protectionism. On April 22, reports emerged that Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba had sent Xi a letter aimed at maintaining stable trade links-signaling that China’s charm diplomacy is still bearing fruit.
The economy, too, seems to be holding on-for now. China’s first-quarter GDP grew 5.4%, ahead of the government’s annual target. Exporters rushed shipments ahead of tariff deadlines, boosting short-term port activity. Officials insist they have the tools to weather external shocks. “We have the ability and confidence to address external challenges,” a statistics bureau spokesperson said.
Yet even within these reassurances, there is tension. A Morgan Stanley poll conducted after the latest tariff hikes found that 44% of urban Chinese fear job losses-the highest level recorded since the early pandemic era. UBS now predicts growth could slip to 3.4% next year. Xi may move to stimulate domestic consumption again, but the real drag on his agenda is not macroeconomic-it is institutional.
The disappearing generals
On the surface, Xi is a man who answers to no one. He has no term limits, no known rivals, and absolute control over the military and the Party. But the recent pattern of disappearances among senior military leaders tells another story.
General He Weidong, a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and third-highest-ranking officer in the PLA, vanished from public view in March. He missed a series of major events in April, including a ceremonial tree-planting and a national security conference. State media simply stopped showing him. If purged, he would be the most senior PLA figure to fall since the Cultural Revolution.
He joins a growing list. Defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe are both gone. Admiral Miao Hua, once handpicked by Xi to enforce ideological purity, was suspended in November 2024. Lieutenant General Tang Yong, part of the military’s anti-graft unit, was removed in March. The heads of China’s Rocket Force-its most strategically sensitive military branch-were also replaced amid corruption investigations.
In a system where loyalty is often valued more than competence, these purges also reflect Xi’s frustration with his own choices. Miao Hua was seen as a loyalist. Xi promoted him and trusted him to enforce Party control. His fall signals that even those closest to Xi are now under suspicion.

A system under strain
As per a Bloomberg report, in a rare candid admission, Xi told top party officials at a January anti-corruption meeting that “changes in the external environment and in the party membership will inevitably lead to various conflicts and problems within the party.” The remarks, later published in the Party journal Qiushi, were a message to the elite: the purges are far from over.
Xi has expanded his crackdown to include not just the military’s procurement branches but also its political offices-those responsible for ideological enforcement. The implication is clear: Xi believes the rot is not just operational but existential. The PLA may not be fully under Party control.
And that has consequences. There are reports of widespread fraud in military procurement, including claims that some strategic missiles were filled with water instead of fuel, and that funds allocated for silo construction were siphoned off. American intelligence agencies believe the purges are degrading the PLA’s combat readiness. Morale is likely suffering. Confidence in the chain of command is eroding, a Bloomberg report said.
This matters not just to Xi’s internal grip, but to his broader foreign policy. “If Xi doesn’t trust his military to win a conflict, especially over Taiwan, his appetite for confrontation may be diminished,” one Western diplomat said. That doesn’t mean China will halt its grey-zone operations in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea-but it may proceed more cautiously.

The PLA will not stop functioning or conducting its usual missions because of the top-brass purge, but the rapid turnover and the sense of crisis will have clear implications for both the PLA and China’s foreign and security policies.

An article in Bloomberg

Looking toward 2027
Underlying all of this is a ticking clock. In 2027, the Communist Party will convene its next Party Congress. Xi, now 71, is expected to seek a fourth term-something unprecedented in modern China. To do so, he must demonstrate that he remains the indispensable leader of a stable, rising China. But internal instability-especially within the military-threatens that narrative.
The 2027 Congress is more than ceremonial. It is where successors are elevated, coalitions are built, and legacies are cemented. Xi has so far resisted naming a successor. But that only increases the stakes. As jockeying begins among second-tier officials, loyalty tests will become even more stringent. The risk of further instability-and further purges-grows.
For now, Xi is benefiting from a rare surge of nationalist unity. Trump’s tariffs have handed him an external enemy to rally against.
But nationalism, like fear, is a volatile currency. If the economy slows, if job losses rise, if instability within the military deepens-then even an external enemy may not be enough to quiet what’s keeping Xi Jinping awake at night.
(With inputs from agencies)